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Abstract 
 
Bridging organizations facilitate a range of governance processes, including cooperation and 
social learning, and are theorized to be a key component of robust governance systems. In this 
article, we use node removal simulations to test structural hypotheses of robustness in a 
regional water governance network in Central America. We investigate the response of network 
measures supporting core governance processes to the targeted removal of bridging 
organizations and other actors, which we compare to random and centrality-based simulations. 
The results indicate removing bridging organizations has a greater impact on the network than 
any other type of actor, suggesting bridging organizations are critical to the robustness of the 
governance system. Furthermore, network structures supporting cooperation may be less robust 
than structures facilitating social learning. We conclude with policy implications of the 
research findings as they relate to the exit problem in governance systems with a large presence 
of international development actors. 
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Introduction 
 
This article investigates whether bridging organizations contribute to the robustness of a 
regional water governance network in Central America. Across the world, regional governance 
institutions are emerging to address the challenges presented by environmental processes that 
occur across large spatial and temporal scales (Lockwood et al. 2010), such as climate change 
(Adger et al. 2009), shifts in the hydrology of aquifers and river basins (Engle and Lemos 
2010), and the spread of plant diseases (McAllister et al. 2017). Regional institutions provide 
a platform for diverse resource users and stakeholder groups to engage in cooperation and 
social learning, two key social processes necessary for effective governance (Schusler et al. 
2003, Lebel et al. 2006, Lubell 2013). However, the robustness of regional governance 
institutions depends on their continued capacity in the face of changes in institutional rules, the 
cast of policy actors, and biophysical processes (Folke et al. 2005, Berkes and Ross 2013).  
 
Bridging organizations are broadly defined as actors that function as intermediaries linking 
other actors across sectors, types of organization, political boundaries, geographic levels, and 
other scales (Brown 1991, Folke et al. 2005, Berkes 2009, Crona and Parker 2012). By 
providing mechanisms for building trust and cooperation (Folke et al. 2005, Lubell et al. 2014), 
promoting social learning (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007, Berardo and Scholz 2010), and increasing 
access to funding and other resources (Newman and Dale 2007, Berkes 2009), bridging 
organizations help facilitate governance processes that individual actors cannot address in 
isolation (Brown 1993, Bodin and Crona 2009, Crona and Parker 2012). Bridging organizations 
may also influence policy and management decisions throughout the wider governance 
network, given their ability to act as information brokers across diverse groups of actors 
(Schoon et al. 2017). For these reasons, bridging organizations are considered to be a key 
component of robust governance institutions (Crona and Parker 2012). 
 
Unfortunately, in developing regions like Central America, bridging organizations often face 
the “exit problem” due to withdrawal of international aid, lack of political support from national 
institutions, or high turnover rates (Moriarty et al. 2013, Ika and Donnelly 2017). The exit 
problem is driven by short funding cycles, shifting organizational priorities, and overall 
capacity gaps in local political systems (Manyara and Jones 2007, Fee 2012). Bridging 
organizations can thus become a double-edged sword; regional governance institutions depend 
on them to support social learning and cooperation, but they may also exit the system. A core 
policy challenge facing social-ecological systems globally is to create bridging organizations 
that are capable of becoming independent, self-sustaining entities (Barrett et al. 2001, Eakin 
and Lemos 2006). 
 
This paper draws on concepts and methods from network science to empirically examine how 
bridging organizations affect the robustness of a regional water governance network in Central 
America. Robustness is broadly defined as the ability of a system to continue to perform after 
experiencing some shock or disturbance (Anderies et al. 2004, Janssen et al. 2007, Berkes and 
Ross 2013), and to assess robustness in the context of governance networks we measure how 
key network structures respond to the removal of bridging organizations and other actors. The 
node removal approach provides a direct analog to the idea of a governance network receiving 
shocks as actors exit the system, and we focus on the effects node removal has on four network 
structures that facilitate cooperation and social learning: density, average local clustering 
coefficient, average path length, and articulation points (Prell et al. 2009, Bodin and Crona 
2009, Berardo and Scholz 2010). By specifically targeting different types of actors, and 
comparing the results to random and centrality-based node removal, we are able to assess the 
contribution of bridging organizations to the robustness of the empirical governance network.  
 
This article marks an advance in research on environmental governance, as few existing studies 
have used node removal simulations to examine the robustness of social networks to 
institutional shocks and other social-ecological changes (e.g., Baggio et al. 2016). Node 
removal simulations provide an opportunity to examine different scenarios of network 
robustness based on empirical data without experimentally removing actors in the field – an 
obviously infeasible research design.  Furthermore, by investigating multiple structures in 
governance networks, we expand on previous literature highlighting how effective governance 
requires simultaneously facilitating multiple social processes, chiefly cooperation and social 
learning (Schusler et al. 2003, Bodin and Crona 2009, Berardo and Scholz 2010, Lubell 2013, 
Bodin 2017). We are also unaware of any existing studies of governance networks that have 
examined articulation points, in spite of the important information this structure can provide 
regarding social learning and the presence of marginalized actors (Prell et al. 2009). Lastly, 
through the use of empirical network data from Central America, our findings contribute to the 
discussion of policy strategies for addressing the exit problem in international development.  
 
Background: Bridging Organizations and Governance in Developing Regions 
 
Bridging organizations have emerged as a means of addressing the complex governance 
challenges facing human society and natural ecosystems in an increasingly interconnected and 
globalized world (Berkes 2009, Crona and Parker 2012). In developing regions like Central 
America, bridging organizations facilitate linkages among the many different local and 
international actors working to manage water and other natural resources. Bridging 
organizations comprise a diverse set of actors, and examples from water governance in Central 
America include the Central American Commission of Environment and Development, 
National Reforestation Association of Panama, Blue Planet Network, and the Water and 
Sanitation Network of El Salvador. Although these actors bridge many different types of 
boundaries, they all work to link different types of actors involved in water governance.  
 
Water governance in developing regions is often supported by non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), donors, and other development actors. Many of these groups are increasingly adopting 
the ideas of bridging organizations in the design of their programs – for example, funding a 
consortium of local and international actors to implement a project, as opposed to a single entity 
– but attention is rarely given to how bridging organizations can be of value at the conclusion 
of development programs (Ika and Donnelly 2017). Even though the international development 
community aspires to catalyze lasting change, the reality remains that most governance 
processes begin to decline following the conclusion of individual projects, as development 
actors leave the area and withdraw technical and financial support (Harvey and Reed 2006, 
Moriarty et al. 2013). Bridging organizations provide an opportunity for development 
programs to devolve support for governance processes, as they fill the same niche and perform 
many of the same functions as development actors, such as facilitating access to resources and 
fostering social learning (Moriarty et al. 2005). This suggests that supporting bridging 
organizations should be a focus of development programs, but if bridging organizations are 
unable to function as permanent fixtures on the institutional landscape, their failure may further 
increase the scale of the exit problem.  
 
Theory: Robustness and Structural Properties of Governance Networks 
 
Robustness refers to the ability of a system to continue to function through periods of 
uncertainty and changing conditions, or after sustaining shocks and large-scale disruptions 
(Anderies et al. 2004). The concept of robustness has been used to frame research on systemic 
vulnerability across diverse settings, ranging from physical infrastructure to institutional 
arrangements for governing social-ecological systems (Folke et al. 2005, Janssen et al. 2007, 
Janssen and Anderies 2007). However, robustness often implies a tradeoff – reducing 
vulnerability may entail reductions in the efficiency and performance of the system (Anderies 
et al. 2004). 
 
In this article, we integrate core concepts from network science with research on environmental 
governance to quantify the contributions of bridging organizations to the robustness of an 
empirical water governance network. The basic analytical approach we apply involves 
comparing how the structure of the network changes in response to the removal of different 
types of actors, and is taken from research on robustness in physical infrastructure networks 
like the Internet (Cohen et al. 2000), electrical grids (Simonsen et al. 2008), and water supply 
(Porse and Lund 2016). In this literature, analyzing network robustness typically involves 
measuring how different network structures respond to random and targeted removal of nodes 
(Bagrow et al. 2015).  
 
Table 1: Definitions of network structures assessed in the node removal simulations, and their 
relationship to cooperation and social learning in governance networks. 
 
Network 
Structure Definition Relationship to Governance 
Density The overall connectivity 
of a network; measured as 
the ratio of the observed 
ties to the maximum 
number of possible ties. 
Dense networks can help build 
trust and facilitate cooperation 
(Berardo and Scholz 2010), but 
may also lead to homogenization 
and reduced adaptive capacity 
(Bodin and Crona 2009). 
Average local 
clustering 
coefficient 
The extent to which a 
network is comprised of 
dense subgroups; 
measured as the mean 
density of ties among all 
the partners of each node. 
Clustered structures facilitate 
cooperation within communities 
of actors, but may limit the 
transfer of knowledge more 
widely through the network 
(Newman and Dale 2007). 
Average path 
length 
The reachability within a 
network; measured as the 
mean number of ties 
between any two nodes. 
Short paths can facilitate the 
transfer of knowledge throughout 
the network, but may depend on a 
base level of trust among actors 
(McAllister et al. 2017). 
Articulation 
points 
The cohesion of a 
network; measured as the 
number of nodes with ties 
to otherwise unconnected 
nodes or subgroups. 
Networks with few articulation 
points may facilitate social 
learning, and indicate greater 
inclusion of marginalized actors 
(Prell et al. 2009). 
 
 
Following this strategy for environmental governance networks, we selected four network 
measures the empirical literature suggests facilitate cooperation and social learning: density, 
average local clustering coefficient, average path length, and articulation points (Table 1). Our 
choice of network structures reflects the assumption that social learning and cooperation are 
two key processes in environmental governance. Social learning is critical to working within 
the complexity of dynamic social-ecological systems (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007), while the need 
for collective-action among many interdependent actors requires cooperation (Ostrom 1990). 
Our approach assumes that governance must balance cooperation and social learning 
simultaneously, and both are supported by different network structures; cooperation is 
facilitated by closed network structures like density and clustering, while social learning is 
facilitated by more open network structures including short paths and bridging (Bodin and 
Crona 2009, Berardo and Scholz 2010). However, the benefits of these network structures may 
depend on characteristics of the social system, including power dynamics (Morrison et al. 
2017) and other variables related to institutional fit (Bodin 2017).  
 
Using a regional water governance network from Central America, we test the hypothesis that 
bridging organizations contribute to key network structures supporting cooperation and social 
learning. Specifically, we expect bridging organizations are able to facilitate cooperation 
through contributing ties that increase the density of relationships among groups of actors, and 
support social learning by spanning otherwise unconnected subgroups in the network. We find 
evidence in support of this hypothesis if the loss of bridging organizations from the network 
results in large impacts to density, average local clustering coefficient, average path length, 
and articulation points.  
 
Data Collection and Network Construction 
 
This study draws on empirical network data from Central America, where nodes represent 
organizations and ties indicate collaboration on water governance activities, such as water 
service provision, watershed restoration, and water policy and planning. We gathered the data 
through a key word “Google” search, in English and Spanish, of geographic terms (e.g., Central 
America, Mesoamerica, Honduras) and contextual terms (e.g., water governance, water 
resources development, integrated water resources management) designed to identify actors 
contributing to water governance processes in the region. We reviewed the first fifty results for 
each set of search terms, and recorded all unique actors. We then examined each actor’s 
website, and removed all actors determined to be outside the boundaries of the network. Actors 
were only included if they were engaged in water governance activities in Central America 
during at least part of the time period spanning 2010 through 2014.  
 
Next, we established undirected ties in the network – all ties associated with an actor selected 
for removal are also removed during the node removal simulations – by recording all of the 
self-reported partners on each actor’s website. Simply having a hyperlink or being mentioned 
on the website does not constitute a tie; partners had to be clearly designated as collaborators 
on shared projects or other work activities. We then expanded the dataset through four rounds 
of snowball sampling – reviewing the partners’ websites and recording all of their ties to other 
actors – after which point no new actors were uncovered. Through this process we identified 
over 2,000 unique water governance actors in Central America, however, we removed all actors 
with only one tie in order to focus on the core structures at the heart of the network. After 
removal, the network contains 624 actors and is composed of a single component with no 
unconnected actors or clusters of actors (Figure 1). Portions of the online information were 
reviewed by key informants, known to one of the authors as a result of previous participatory 
research conducted in the region. 
 
 
Figure 1: Network of water governance actors in Central America, with nodes shaded by 
actor type and sized by degree centrality. The position of the actors was determined using a 
spring-embedded layout. 
 
 
Lastly, we classified nodes into six types of actors: bridging organizations, international NGOs, 
local NGOs, research and education, donors, and local organizations (e.g., community-based 
organizations, government agencies). We exogenously determined whether or not actors were 
considered bridging organizations through reviewing their mission statements online. In order 
for an actor to be classified as a bridging organization, it had to have the explicit aim of working 
as an intermediary spanning between actors from different sectors, geographic and 
administrative levels, or types of organization. For example, the website for the Blue Planet 
Network states the group “connects funders, NGOs, the public and communities in need to 
improve the planning, selection, management and monitoring of water and sanitation 
programs.” In this regard, the focus of the analysis here is on bridging organizations generally, 
and we do not distinguish between specific forms of bridging that may be occurring. 
 
Analytical Methods 
 
Our analysis compares three types of node removal simulations: random, degree centrality, and 
actor type. Random removal serves as a measure of baseline robustness, where all the actors in 
the network have the same probability of being removed. Removal by degree centrality occurs 
through sequentially removing the actors with the most ties and represents a form of worst-
case scenario from a structural perspective; actors with more ties may or may not contribute 
more to governance activities and outcomes, but our data do not allow us to assess this directly. 
Removal by actor type involves specifically targeting different classes of actors, such as 
bridging organizations. We expect different types of actors to contribute different structures to 
the overall governance network, as each type of actor has its own unique objectives, decision-
making process, and resources, all of which help shape patterns of collaboration with other 
actors in the network. With this analytical framing, we are able to assess both the robustness 
of the empirical governance network to the removal of different types of actors, as well as 
compare the removal of each actor type against the baseline robustness and structural worst-
case scenario. 
 
For this study, we developed an R package for social network analysis using the R Environment 
for Statistical Computing (R Development Core Team 2014) that allows us to remove nodes 
randomly, by degree centrality, and by actor type. In each of the simulations, the analytical 
approach consists of removing increasing numbers of nodes from the network, and measuring 
network statistics after each increase in the level of node removal. In order to capture variance 
in the responses of the network measures, multiple random samples at the same level of node 
removal are necessary. For example, if we simulate the random removal of two nodes from a 
twenty-node network, there are nearly two-hundred unique pairs of nodes that could be 
selected. In the case of node removal by actor type, random samples occur within each class of 
actor. For node removal by degree centrality, random samples are necessary when multiple 
nodes have the same number of ties.  
 
The limit to the range of the simulations – the maximum number of nodes that can be removed 
– is dictated by the node class containing the fewest nodes. While there is no computational 
limit for random and degree centrality simulations, in the absence of compelling theoretical 
reasons for doing so, results should not be compared across simulations beyond the limit 
imposed by the structure of the dataset. Once all the nodes of a particular class have been 
removed, that node class no longer has an impact on the structure of the network at higher 
levels of removal. Therefore, if results are to be compared across simulations, the maximum 
number of nodes removed in each simulation should correspond to the number of nodes in the 
smallest node class. With 84 nodes, representing 13% of the total nodes in the network, local 
NGOs are the smallest node class in the empirical dataset. 
 
Increasing in 1% intervals, we progressively remove up to 13% of the actors in the empirical 
network in each of the random, degree centrality, and actor type simulations. At each 1% 
increase in the level of removal we take nearly 7,000 random samples and calculate density, 
average local clustering coefficient, average path length, and articulation points, for each 
sample. While computationally more expensive, increasing the number of random draws helps 
capture the variance in the four network measures across the range of the simulations. We apply 
a generalized additive model (GAM) smoother1 to the results in order to compare the 
differences in the expected values of the network measures across the simulations. The 
smoother does not assume a given response shape, which further allows us to assess the 
behavior of each network measure across the simulation types.  
 
                                                          
1 Formalized by Hastie and Tibshirani (1986), GAMs use multiple smoothing functions to estimate the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables. With GAMs it is not necessary to know the 
relationship between variables from the outset, which enables the observation of any hidden patterns or 
structures within the data.  
Lastly, we examine an additional four network measures – average degree, betweenness 
centrality, constraining ties, and diversity – to validate our exogenous classification of bridging 
organizations. These node-level measures are calculated for each actor, and we report the 
average value for each type of actor (e.g., bridging organizations, international NGOs) in order 
to assess the extent to which different actor types contribute to bridging structures in the 
network. These measures are not included in the node removal simulations. 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Results of Node Removal Simulations 
 
Descriptive network statistics assessing bridging structures (Table 2) help unravel the unique 
positioning of different types of actors in the regional water governance network from Central 
America, and justify our focus on bridging organizations as key governance actors. Bridging 
organizations are more active in the network; they are both more prevalent and have the highest 
average degree, indicating they tend to have more ties than other types of actors. Bridging 
organizations also have the highest betweenness centrality scores, indicating they are more 
frequently located on the shortest path between other actors in the network. The relatively low 
value on constraining ties indicates bridging organizations tend to have fewer ties to actors who 
are themselves strongly interconnected, which is in line with Burt’s (2009) definition of 
bridging ties. Bridging organizations also tend to have more diverse partners, and frequently 
span between different types of actors in the network. These descriptive statistics shed light on 
the positioning of bridging organizations in the empirical governance network, however, they 
do not indicate how robust governance processes are to the exit of actors from the system. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive network statistics capturing bridging structures by actor type. 
Actor Type Nodes 
Average 
Degree 
Average 
Betweenness 
Centrality 
Average 
Constraining 
Ties 
Average  
Diversity* 
Local 
organizations 
106 4.0 348 0.382 2.42 
Research and 
education 
93 5.1 945 0.370 2.12 
Donors 102 3.9 400 0.355 2.36 
Local NGOs 84 4.2 505 0.391 2.19 
International 
NGOs 
99 5.2 604 0.343 2.41 
Bridging 
organizations 
140 9.4 1673 0.286 2.59 
* The maximum diversity score is six, representing the six types of actor in the empirical 
network. 
 
The impacts of removing bridging organizations from the regional governance network, and 
their relationship to baseline robustness (random removal) and the structural worst-case 
scenario (removal by degree centrality), are provided in Figure 2. The x-axis displays the level 
of node removal in the simulations, and the y-axis indicates the response of each of the four 
network measures across the simulations. Only the line representing the GAM smoother is 
displayed, as including the tens-of-thousands of individual data points results in a cluttered and 
uninterpretable graph. The narrow range of the standard error bars, on account of the large 
number of samples, makes them indiscernible from the smoother lines. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Results from random, degree centrality, and bridging organization node removal 
simulations for density, average local clustering coefficient, average path length, and 
articulation points. The dashed black line represents the observed value in the full network 
prior to node removal. 
 
The results for density and average local clustering coefficient suggest structures supporting 
cooperation in the empirical network are relatively robust to the random removal of actors over 
the range of the simulations, but vulnerable to the exit of bridging organizations. In the case of 
random removal, the expected value for density across the range of the simulation is unchanged 
from the observed value (0.009) prior to the removal of actors. Targeting bridging 
organizations, however, results in a linear decrease in density as more actors are removed. With 
regard to the average local clustering coefficient, the statistic decreases linearly from the 
observed value (0.188) in response to both random removal and targeting bridging 
organizations, but the magnitude of the decrease is significantly larger for bridging 
organizations. Removing the highest-degree actors from the network results in the most 
dramatic decrease in density, which is expected given the definition of density only takes into 
account the number of nodes and ties. That removal by degree centrality also results in the 
largest decrease in average local clustering coefficient indicates actors with more ties also tend 
to be located in relatively dense subgroups. 
 
The results for average path length and articulation points indicate structures supporting social 
learning are relatively robust in the empirical governance network, and perhaps more so than 
structures facilitating cooperation. In the case of both random removal and targeted removal of 
bridging organizations, the expected value of average path length increases linearly above the 
observed value (3.58) over the range of the simulations. The loss of bridging organizations 
results in a larger response, but the increase is slight in both cases. With regard to articulation 
points, the measure appears to grow logistically from the observed value (2) for both random 
removal and removal of bridging organizations, but the exit of bridging organizations again 
results in a larger impact on the measure than random removal. The decreasing marginal 
response of articulation points suggests that the network is most vulnerable to the initial 
removal of bridging organizations, which can fragment large, but loosely connected, subgroups 
of actors from the rest of the network. The response of average path length and articulation 
points to the targeted removal of high-degree actors is much larger than either random removal 
or the removal of bridging organizations, indicating actors with many ties are more likely to be 
located on the shortest path between other actors in the network, and to be connected to more 
isolated actors and subgroups of actors on the periphery of the network.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Results from random and actor type node removal simulations. Each boxplot 
contains all the results from removing 1% up to 13% of the actors in the network, and 
provides for comparison of the full range of response of the four network measures across the 
simulations. The dashed black line represents the observed value in the full network prior to 
node removal. 
 
 
The results from targeting each of the six different actor types for removal are displayed in 
Figure 3, which includes the results from random removal as a baseline comparison. The y-
axis displays the changes in the network structures that result from removing 1% up to 13% of 
the actors in the network, and the spread of the boxplots vertically captures the overall range 
of response. 
 
With regard to network structures supporting cooperation, targeting bridging organizations 
results in an overall larger response in density and average local clustering coefficient than 
removing any other type of actor in the network. In the case of density, removing all other actor 
types results in a slight increase in the mean density above the observed value in the full 
network, which is indicative of the large number of ties bridging organizations bring to the 
network. With the exception of donor organizations, removing all other actor types results in 
an overall decrease in the average local clustering coefficient. The increase in the measure as 
donors are removed indicates these organizations do not generally partner with other actors in 
the network who are themselves strongly interconnected. For the two network structures 
associated with social learning, average path length and articulation points, removing all actor 
types results in an increase in the measures above their observed values in the full network. 
However, the loss of bridging organizations has a much greater impact on these structures than 
removing any other type of actor.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The loss of bridging organizations from the regional water governance network in Central 
America results in a larger shock to structures supporting cooperation and social learning than 
any other actor type, indicating bridging organizations are key actors in the network. However, 
these results also illustrate a possible paradox of robustness in the network: structures 
facilitating cooperation and social learning are strongly supported by bridging organizations, 
which in turn makes the network more vulnerable to their exit. The results further suggest 
network structures supporting cooperation may be less robust than structures supporting social 
learning, which is in line with studies demonstrating the relative difficulty of establishing 
cooperation versus coordinating the distribution of knowledge and other resources (Sandström 
and Carlsson 2008, Berardo and Scholz 2010, McAllister et al. 2017). 
 
The removal of bridging organizations decreases density and the average local clustering 
coefficient, which suggests bridging organizations are well-positioned to support cooperation 
within subgroups in regional governance networks. At the same time, the increase in 
articulation points fragments the network by isolating loosely connected subgroups, and 
indicates bridging organizations may help facilitate social learning by spanning subgroups. 
However, we recognize the benefits of any particular network structure are not monotonically 
increasing, and governance networks are assumed to be more effective when they maintain a 
balance between intermediate levels of clustering and bridging (Bodin and Crona 2009). Too 
much clustering in subgroups can result in an “us-and-them” mentality and impede the flow of 
information and other resources, yet subgroups are a natural part of governance networks that 
span multiple sectors and geographic boundaries, such as regional governance networks, and 
may indicate cooperation among communities in the network. For this reason, bridging across 
subgroups in the wider governance network is critical for social learning at the regional level, 
and may also help facilitate the creation of inter-group trust and social capital (Crona and 
Parker 2012). 
 
These findings support the hypothesis that bridging organizations, and their sustainability in 
the institutional landscape, are critical to the robustness of structures supporting cooperation 
and social learning in regional governance networks. However, the structural contributions of 
other types of actors may also be considerable, and the exit of traditional development actors 
has always been a concern for the robustness of governance systems in Central America and 
other developing regions. After bridging organizations, removing international and local NGOs 
produced the next largest decrease in the average local clustering coefficient and articulation 
points, which indicates these actors also contribute substantially to structures supporting 
cooperation and social learning in the empirical network. The descriptive statistics further 
indicate international NGOs may directly contribute bridging ties, given their relatively high 
levels of betweenness centrality and average diversity. Education and research organizations 
possess an even higher betweenness centrality score than international NGOs, suggesting they 
are particularly important conduits for facilitating knowledge distribution and social learning 
throughout the water governance network in Central America, although their contribution to 
structures supporting cooperation are minimal. 
 
The removal of donors and local organizations produced the smallest effects across all four 
network structures, indicating they contribute the least to structures supporting cooperation and 
social learning in the empirical governance network. Removing donors actually led to increases 
in density and local clustering, which indicates they have relatively few partners in the network, 
and the few partners they do have are not strongly interconnected. This is in line with the 
primary function of donor organizations, which is to fund development programs, not engage 
in implementation. However, that donors usually aspire to build relationships among their 
project partners indicates they may not be achieving success in this regard in Central America. 
The diminished structural contribution of local organizations is indicative of the fact that the 
primary focus of their activities is at a different scale; they typically collaborate with NGOs 
and bridging organizations in order to obtain knowledge of best practices and other resources 
for supporting local development projects. In this regard, a key function of bridging 
organizations and higher-level development actors lies in facilitating access to these benefits 
to local organizations, who are often key actors within their geographically-defined subgroups 
in regional governance networks. We recognize the data collection method also favors higher-
level organizations – they are more likely to have websites – but even if interviews or surveys 
were feasible we still would not expect local organizations to occupy critical positions in the 
regional network.  
 
Collectively, these findings suggest two core policy recommendations for enhancing the 
robustness of regional governance networks and addressing the exit problem in international 
development. First, while the regional water governance network in Central America is 
relatively robust to the random removal of actors, the network is especially vulnerable to the 
loss of even a small number of bridging organizations, suggesting they should be targeted for 
strategic support. Furthermore, bridging organizations tend to collaborate with a greater 
diversity of actors, and a core component of institutional capacity-building involves “building 
more effective and dynamic relationships between different stakeholders behaving in often 
unpredictable ways” (Ika and Donnelly 2017, p. 45). While these structural and functional 
contributions of bridging organizations may buffer governance networks against the exit of 
international development actors, in the event that bridging organizations depend on these 
actors for operational support they may still be susceptible to the exit problem. International 
development actors may initially consider prioritizing strategic funding to bridging 
organizations for training and support, but over the long term as international actors “work 
themselves out of a job” they should be working with local political institutions to develop 
homegrown support for bridging organizations (Breslin 2013).  
 
Second, network structures supporting cooperation appear to be less robust than structures 
facilitating social learning in the empirical governance network, and these structures are 
predominantly contributed by bridging organizations and NGOs. Strengthening cooperation 
among diverse actors in Central America, especially with independent and self-sustaining 
bridging organizations, would further strengthen the robustness of the empirical network to the 
exit of international development actors. However, bridging organizations may be viewed 
negatively by some communities in highly polarized societies. This is particularly true in 
Central America, where the history of political strife and violent conflict permeates most 
debates over natural resource policy and planning, and actors that attempt to broker cooperation 
across ideological divides often face reproach from all sides. In these situations, local 
knowledge is critical as power asymmetries, conflict, and other characteristics of the social and 
political system may suggest particular ways of working with specific actors to build the social 
capital and trust necessary for achieving lasting cooperation (Pretty and Ward 2001, Hileman 
et al. 2016, Ika and Donnelly 2017, Morrison et al. 2017). 
 
While this study makes a number of theoretical and methodological contributions to the 
empirical literature on environmental governance, a number of challenges remain that must be 
addressed in future research. One of the biggest challenges is the difficulty of tying network 
structures to outcomes in the empirical context; though we find evidence that the structure of 
the regional water governance network in Central America is relatively robust, this does not 
mean that the network is necessarily improving biophysical or sociopolitical outcomes. 
Explicitly examining different forms of collaboration (e.g., project planning, funding, 
implementation) and bridging ties (e.g., sectoral, geographic level, mandated/voluntary) would 
further enrich research on robustness in governance networks. Lastly, the empirical governance 
network we analyze is a cross-section, and there is a pressing need to develop data collection 
tools for monitoring the evolution of governance networks over time. This would allow us to 
develop a deeper understanding of network resilience, or how governance networks reorganize 
after sustaining institutional shocks resulting from the exit of actors.  
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